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What is the right way to treat an image? Plato notoriously both condemns the power of 
images and makes use of memorably vivid and dramatic images himself, all the while 
providing caveats about their deceptive qualities and limitations. Clearly, there are right and 
wrong ways to handle images. One of the most vivid illustrations in the Greek tradition of the 
wrong way to treat an image is undoubtedly the story of the unhappy young man who fell in 
love with the statue of Aphrodite at Knidos, the great masterpiece made by Praxiteles. 
Concealing himself in the temple at night, he tried to sexually assault the statue, leaving behind 
a dark stain on the thigh of the statue that the temple attendants continue to point out to 
wondering tourists. 
Finally, the violence of his desires made him lose his reason, his audacity serving him for 
pimp. One evening, at sunset, he slid unseen behind the temple door and hid in the darkest 
corner, holding his breath. The keepers closed the gate as usual, and this new Anchises 
found himself alone inside. Who would dare recount the sort of deeds he consummated 
that wicked night? In short, at daybreak this sign of his amorous embraces was discovered, 
a sign which ever since has marked the goddess as a reminder of her suffering. As for the 
young man, they say he threw himself upon the rocks, or into the sea. In any case he 
disappeared forever.1 
PS. LUCÍAN, Amores 16.19—31 
 
Other stories of such agalmatopkilia occur in a variety of sources, and a number of 
scholars have recently commented on the implications of this fetish for understanding the 
way the Greeks looked at art and the way that they worshipped their gods.2 
In the Phaedrus, Plato presents a curiously similar image to this story of the sexual 
assault of a statue, with the description of how the dark horse of the soul tries to sexually 
assault the image of the beautiful beloved, only to be restrained by the reverent awe of the 
 
1  πέρας αί σψοδραί των έν αΰτώ πόθων επιτάσεις άπενοήθησαν, εΰρέθη δέ τόλμα τής 
επιθυμίας μαστροπός· ήδη γάρ έπί δύσιν ήλιου κλίνοντος ήρεμα λαθών τους παρόντας 
οπισθε τής θύρας παρεισερρύη καί στάς αφανής ένδοτάτω σχεδόν οΰδ’ άναπνέων ήτρέμει, 
συνήθως δέ των ζακόρων έξωθεν τήν θύραν έψελκυσαμένων ένδον è καινός Άγχίσης 
καθείρκτο. καί τί γάρ αρρήτου νυκτός έγώ τόλμαν ή λάλος έπ’ ακριβές ΰμίν διηγούμαι; των 
έρωτικών περιπλοκών ιχνη ταυτα μεθ’ ήμέραν ώψθηκαίτόν σπίλον είχενή θεός ών έπαθεν 
έλεγχον, αυτόνγε μήντόν νεανίαν, ώς è δημώδης ιστορεί λόγος, ή κατά πετρών φασιν ή κατά 
πελάγιου κύματος ένεχθέντα παντελώς άψανή γενέσθαι. (trans. Andrew Kallimachos) 
 
2 Steiner 2001 raises the issue of the place of statues in Greek thought, while Eisner 2007 
suggests that there is a particular mode of religious viewing of statues in Greek and Roman 
religion. Kindt 2012 examines a number of stories about interactions with religious statues, 
including the problem with agalmatopkilia. 
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soul’s charioteer, who falls back, stunned by the vision of the beloved as by a divine image. 
The dark horse, like a rampant stallion, with stretched out tail and violent exertions, 
endeavors to leap upon this beautiful form, 
Struggling, and neighing, and pulling he forces them again with the same purpose to 
approach the beloved one, and when they are near him, he lowers his head, raises his tail, 
takes the bit in his teeth, and pulls shamelessly... And as the charioteer looks upon the 
beloved, his memory is borne back to the true nature of beauty, and he sees it standing 
with prudence upon a holy pedestal, and when he sees this he is afraid and falls backward 
in reverence, and in falling he is forced to pull the reins so violently backward as to bring 
both horses upon their haunches.3 
254de 
The charioteer sees the beautiful beloved as an image of the divine beauty, like a statue 
(agalma) of a god on its pedestal (en hathro) and resists the dark horse’s attempts to have sex 
with it.4 If the charioteer maintains control, the soul mayreturn again to the divine realm, but 
if the dark horse succeeds in getting its pleasure, the soul is condemned to wander long ages in 
the shadowy realms. 
Plato uses this image of two ways of treating an image as an illustration of how—and 
how not—to treat images in general, whether they be the image of beauty presented by the 
beautiful beloved or even images of wisdom and justice presented by the writings of a 
philosopher. In every case, the image must serve as a reminder, a stimulus to recollection and 
a track that marks the path that memory and reason must follow to arrive at truth, rather than 
something to be enjoyed as an end in itself. The proper treatment of an image is thus itself an 
image of the process of recollection, and the ritual actions of adornment, sacrifice, and 
following in a procession that are appropriate to the treatment of statues of gods become 
images, not just of how the lover should treat the beautiful beloved, but of how the orator 
should compose a speech and of the way the philosopher should treat all the images of divine 
truth that appear in the world. The graphic image of the horse sexually assaulting the boy is 
likewise an image of what can go wrong when an image is used not as a reminder but as a 
source of pleasure in itself. 
In the Phaedrus, then, Plato plays with the problematic status of images, employing 
some of his most vivid and memorable images to illustrate how images may be used 
philosophically in the process of recollection.5 Both the worship paid to the beloved icon and 
good speeches employ images and mnemonic associations to lead the follower, step by step, 
toward the truth. While Phaedrus fixes his desire upon the images, both the beloved boy and 
the speeches, Socrates uses these images as signs on his philosophic path, reminders of whence 
 
3 βιαζόμενος, χρεμετίζων, έλκων ήνάγκασεν αύ προσελθεΐν χοΐς παιδικοίς έπί τούς αυτούς 
λόγους, καί επειδή εγγύς ήσαν, έγκύψας καί έκτείνας τήν κέρκον, ένδακών τον χαλινόν, μετ’ 
άναιδείας έλκει· 254bc ίδόντος δέ του ήνιόχου ή μνήμη πρός τήν του κάλλους ψύσιν ήνέχθη, 
καί πάλιν εΐδεν αυτήν μετά σωφροσύνης έν άγνω βάθρω βεβώσαν ίδούσα δέ έ'δεισέ τε καί 
σεψθεΐσα άνέπεσεν ύπτια, καί άμα ήναγκάσθη εις τούπίσω έλκύσαι τάς ήνίας οίίτω σψόδρα, 
ώστ’ έπί τά ισχία αμψω καθίσαι τώ ϊππω. (Translations of Plato are taken, with minor 
modifications, from the 1925 Fowler translation.) 
4 When Plato refers to the beautiful beloved as like a statue in the Phaedrus, the word is often 
(e.g., 25мб, 252d7) άγαλμα, although other terms do appear (εικόνας 25ot>4, εϊδωλον 
25ods, cp. 255d8, 276ag). For a recent overview of the terminology for Greek religious 
statues, see Nick 2002:11-25, with a catalog of literary testimonia pp. 211-231. 
5 Gonzalez 2007 rightly emphasizes that recollection is a process, an ongoing practice rather 
than a single action, and he also importantly links this kind of process with the ways Plato 
talks about eros: the things recollected, like the objects of eros, are neither possessed by the 
subject nor totally divorced. 
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he has come and whither he is going. 
The Process of Recollection through Images 
The Phaedrus is notable as a dialogue in which the stimulus of visual images is connected 
with the process of philosophic recollection; it is the beloved’s beauty that sets the soul in 
motion along the path of recollection.6 Since Platocharacteristically never sets out a systematic 
account of how images relate to the process of recollection, to clarify this relation we must 
look to references he makes in other dialogues, as well as to the ways some more systematic 
receivers of his ideas, such as Aristotle, Proclus, and even the modern semiotician Peirce, treat 
the matter. 
Perhaps the most significant discussion occurs in the Phaedo, where Plato has Socrates 
discuss different forms of recollection with Simmias, showing how certain visual images 
provoke recollection in different ways. 
“Well, you know that a lover when he sees a lyre or a cloak or anything else which his 
beloved is wont to use, perceives the lyre and in his mind receives an image of the boy to 
whom the lyre belongs, do you not? But this is recollection, just as when one sees 
Simmias, one often remembers Cebes, and I could cite countless such examples.” 
“To be sure you could,” said Simmias. 
“Now,” said he, “is that sort of thing a kind of recollection? Especially when it takes 
place with regard to things which have already been forgotten through time and 
inattention?” 
“Certainly,” he replied. 
“Well, then,” said Socrates, “can a person on seeing a picture of a horse or of a lyre be 
reminded of a man, or on seeing a picture of Simmias be reminded of Cebes?” 
“Surely.” 
“And on seeing a picture of Simmias he can be reminded of Simmias himself?” 
“Yes,” said he. 
“All these examples show, then, that recollection is caused by like things and also by 
unlike things, do they not?” 
“Yes.”7 
 
6 Ср., the excellent discussion of Nightingale 2011:157-168, who, however, focuses on the 
act of gazing ( theoria), rather than other aspects of the interaction with the beautiful beloved 
as an agalma. 
7 ούκούν οίσθα άτι οί έρασταί, όταν ϊδωσιν λύραν ή ίμάτιον ή άλλο τι οις τά παιδικά αύτών 
ε’ιωθε χρήσθαι, πάσχουσι τούτο- έ'γνωσάν τε τήν λύραν καί έν τή διανοία ελαβον το είδος 
τού παιδός ου ήν ή λύρα; τούτο δέ έστιν άνάμνησις- ώσπερ γε καί Σιμμίαν τις ίδών πολλάκις 
κέβητος άνεμνήσθη, καί άλλα που μυρία τοιαύτ’ αν εί'η. μυρία μέντοι νή Δία, έ'ψη è 
Σιμμίας. 
ούκούν, ή δ’ δς, το τοιούτον άνάμνησις τίς έστι; μάλιστα μέντοι όταν τις τούτο πάθη 
περί έκεΐνα ά ύπό χρόνου καί τού μή έπισκοπείν ήδη έπελέληστο; πάνυ μέν ούν, εφη. 
τί δέ; ή δ’ 8ς· έ'στιν ϊππον γεγραμμένον ίδόντα καί λύραν γεγραμμένην ανθρώπου 
άναμνησθήναι, καί Σιμμίαν ίδόντα γεγραμμένον κέβητος άναμνησθήναι; 
πάνυ γε. 
ούκούν καί Σιμμίαν ίδόντα γεγραμμένον αυτού Σιμμίου άναμνησθήναι; 
έ'στι μέντοι, εφη. 
άρ’ ούν ού κατά πάντα ταύτα συμβαίνει τήν άνάμνησιν είναι μέν άψ’ όμοιων, είναι δέ 
καί από άνομοίων; συμβαίνει. 
αΚΚ’ όταν γε από των όμοιων άναμιμνήσκηταί τις τι, άρ’ ούκ άναγκαίον τόδε 
προσπάσχειν, έννοείν ε’ιτε τι έλλείστει τούτο κατά τήν ομοιότητα ε’ιτε μή έκείνου ου 
άνεμνήσθη; ανάγκη, εφη. 
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Phaedo 73d-74a 
Socrates emphasizes that visual similarity is not the only way in which an image can 
make the viewer think of the thing which it represents for the viewer, the thing that is 
signified by that image functioning as a sign, but Plato does not pursue the distinctions 
systematically.8 
The modern semiotician Peirce draws a more systematic distinction between three 
types of signs that relate to their signifieds in different ways: the index, which bears a physical 
or causal relation to its signified; the icon, which shares a visual or other qualitative 
resemblance to its signified; and the symbol, which has an indirect or arbitrary relation to its 
signified.9 The differences between these kinds of signs may be illustrated with the example 
of fire. Smoke is an index of fire; it indicates that fire is present to have produced it. A stylized 
picture of flames, by contrast, is an icon, since the picture bears a visual resemblance to what 
it represents. The English word ‘fire’ itself is a symbol, since, whether written or spoken, it 
bears no visual or auditory resemblance to the phenomenon, nor is there any direct or causal 
relation between the word and the thing. Peirce’s terms provide us with a useful vocabulary to 
make systematic distinctions, even if Plato himself avoided doing so. 
Peirce may well have drawn his terminology from the Platonic tradition, for Proclus 
likewise makes a distinction between icons (eikones) and symbols (sumbola), between images 
that represent through similarity and those that represent indirectly or even through 
contraries.10 Icons work through a kind of mimesis, whereas symbols work through analogical 
reasoning and can thus represent the opposite of what they appear to present—an important 
point for Proclus in his discussion of the more scandalous elements in Homer.11 
 
8 Studies, such as Said 1987 or Vernant 1990, that attempt to draw distinctions between types 
of images in Greek thought provide a useful way of thinking about possible differences, but 
Plato seems deliberately to avoid making systematic distinctions between icons, idols, and 
other forms of images, using different vocabulary interchangeably. 
9 Peirce expresses these distinctions in different ways in his corpus, but the following represent 
his differentiations. Peirce 1991: 30 “It follows that there are three kinds of representations, 
ist. Those whose relation to their objects is a mere community in some quality, and these 
representations may be termed Likenesses. 2nd. Those whose relation to their objects 
consists in a correspondence in fact, and these may be termed Indices or Signs. 3rd. Those 
the ground of whose relation to their objects is an imputed character, which are the same as 
general signs, and these may be termed Symbols!’ Ср., Peirce 1991:183 “This explains why 
there should be three classes of signs; for there is a triple connection of sign, thing signified, 
cognition produced in the mind. There maybe a mere relation of reason between the sign and 
the thing signified; in that case the sign is an icon. Or there may be a direct physical 
connection; in that case, the sign is an index. Or there may be a relation which consists in 
the fact that the mind associates the sign with its object; in that case the sign is a name!’ 
Likenesses and icons are terms for signs that represent through similarity of quality (visual 
or otherwise), whereas a name is one kind of symbol, which represents through arbitrary or 
customary association. 
10 As Dillon 1976 notes, Proclus is not very systematic in his distinction between icons (εικό-
νες) and symbols (σύμβολα), but he does repeatedly distinguish between representation 
through similarity and indirect representation. See also the comments in Lamberton 2012 
for the relation of Proclus’ theories of signs to Peircean semiotics. Smyth 1999: 57 sug-
gests Peirce’s reception of “Neoplatonic elements in the Romantic tradition” deriving 
from Emerson, but does not make the connection with his categories of signs. 
11 Proclus in Remp. 86.15-19. In all of these imaginings in the manner of the mythmakers, one 
thing is designated by another. This is not always through icons representing models; 
rather, sometimes symbols are used, and the relationship with the things that are indicated 
exists by virtue of analogy, έν πάσαις γάρ ταΐς τοιαύταις ψαντασίαις κατά τούς μυθο- 
πλάστας άλλα έξ άλλων ένδείκνυται, καί ού τά μέν εικόνες, τά δέ παραδείγματα, όσα διά 
τούτων σημαίνουσιν, άλλα τά μέν σύμβολα, τά δέ έξ αναλογίας έχει τήν πρός ταύτα 
συμπάθειαν, (trans. Lamberton 2012, modified) Cp. also, 1.77.13-29 and 1.198.13-24. 
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Proclus is less interested in how the process happens, but, in his treatise On Memory and 
Recollection, Aristotle describes the process of recollection as a movement (kinesis) and uses 
the verb ‘to hunt’ (thêreuomen) for the process by which we move by recollection from one 
thing to another in the search for the thing to be recollected. Aristotle focuses on the process 
of recollection as a movement from the present stimulus to the thing being recollected, step by 
step from sign to signified. He identifies three kinds of steps, to something similar, to 
something opposite, and to something neighboring. 
And this is exactly why we hunt for the next thing in the chain, starting in our thoughts 
from the present or from something else, and from something similar, or opposite, or 
neighboring. By this means recollection occurs.12 
ARISTOTLE, de memoria 451Ы8-20, trans, SORABJI, modified 
 
Aristotle illustrates the neighboring (to suneggus) with the example of letters in the alphabet, 
but Plato’s chains of association have many more varied kinds of links than these.13 
Plato uses all of the kinds of image signs that Peirce describes, but, in the discussion 
between Socrates and Simmias in the Phaedo, he is most interested in the process of indirect 
reasoning from symbol to signified, the movement upon which Aristotle focuses. Someone 
may be reminded of a horse or a lyre or Simmias by seeing a picture of a horse or a lyre or 
Simmias (an icon in Peircean terms). However, he may also be reminded of Cebes, because 
Cebes owns the horse or the lyre of which he is seeing the picture or because Cebes is the 
inseparable friend of Simmias. This is a symbolic relation in Peircean terms, just as the name 
of Cebes may also cause him to recall the man himself. The point here, however, is the chain 
of indirect relations that can be set up, since someone may be reminded of Cebes by hearing 
the name of Simmias or even the name of Simmias’ horse Buttercup, which makes him think 
of the horse Buttercup, which is owned by Simmias, who is the friend of Cebes. From the name 
Buttercup to Cebes is a movement along a symbolic chain by means of recollection. Plato does 
not, in the Phaedo, pursue these chains further, but he does note the the process of recollection 
is triggered by a sense impression that starts off the chain of associations. 
In the Phaedrus, Plato likewise features the importance of visual images that begin the 
process of recollection, but he emphasizes the process of reasoning that enables the recollecter 
to follow the tracks back to the signified. The recollection moves (ionta) by reasoning 
(logismô) from a multiplicity of sense perceptions back to the one thing that unites them, the 
true reality glimpsed by the soul before its incarnation. 
For a human being must understand according to the so-called form, moving from a 
multiplicity of perceptions to a unity collected together by reasoning. And this is 
recollection of those things which our soul beheld once upon a time while it was 
journeying together with the god and
 
12 διό καί τό εφεξής θηρεύομεν νοήσαντες άπό τού νύν ή άλλου τινός, καί άψ’ όμοιου ή 
εναντίου ή τού σύνεγγυς, διά τούτο γίγνεται ή άνάμνησις· 
13 Aristotle’s example (452313-16) suggests that he too might have been thinking of a wide 
range of possibilities within his three categories, το δ’ αίτιον άτι ταχύ άπ’ αλλου έπ’ άλλο 
έρχονται, οιον άπό γάλακτος έπί λευκόν, από λευκού δ’ έπ’ άέρα, καί από τούτου έψ’ 
υγρόν, άψ’ ου έμνήσθη μετοπώρου, ταύτην έπιζητών τήν ώραν. The reason is that people 
go quickly from one thing to another, e.g., from milk to white, from white to air, and from 
this to fluid, from which one remembers autumn. 
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looking beyond the things which we now say to exist, and ascending up into the really 
real.14 
249c 
This ability to recollect, rather than simply remember, distinguishes humans from animals, as 
Aristotle also argues, because it is a kind of reasoning.15 Humans can thus even use their 
reasoning to fashion the image of an immortal being, even though they have never seen or even 
adequately conceived of a real god.16 
Simple visual similarity or imitation is thus not the only way in which a sign can remind 
the viewer of the signified; the process of recollection involves moving by reasoning from one 
related thing to another, whether it be from Simmias’ horse to Simmias to Cebes or from a 
particular appearance of beauty to the idea of the beautiful itself. The different kinds of 
semiotic connections can, I argue, help us to understand how, in the Phaedrus, Plato uses the 
image of the beautiful beloved as a divine statue to illustrate the complex ways in which this 
process might work—or might go wrong. 
Treating Him Right 
In the palinode, Socrates claims that the visual appearance of beauty provides the most 
brilliant reminder of the true realities that the soul saw before incarnation, while other things, 
like justice, provide only dim images. 
 
Now, for justice and prudence and all the others revered by souls there is no 
brightness in the likenesses here, but only a few, approaching the images through 
the muddled sense organs, behold the nature of that represented, and those only 
with great difficulty... But regarding beauty, just as I said earlier, it shone forth 
among those realities, and since we came hither we have perceived it shining 
most clearly through the clearest of our senses. For sight is to us the keenest of 
the perceptions that come through the body. Wisdom is not seen through this, 
for wisdom would create terribly fierce loves if any such clear image of it were 
provided coming to the sight, as also would all other such lovely things. But here 
and now beauty alone has this nature, that it is most clearly apparent and most 
 
14 δει γάρ άνθρωπον συνιέναι κατ’ είδος λεγόμενον, έκ πολλών ίόντ’ αισθήσεων εις εν 
λογισμφ συναιρούμενου- τούτο δ’ έστίν άνάμνησις εκείνων ά ποτ’ εΤδεν ήμών ή ψυχή 
συμπορευθεΐσα θεω καί ύπεριδούσα ά νυν είναι ψαμεν, καί άνακύψασα εις τό ον όντως, 
διό δή δικαίως μόνη πτερούται ή του φιλοσόφου διάνοια· πρός γάρ έκείνοις άεί έστιν 
μνήμη κατά δύναμιν, πρός οισπερ θεός ών θεΐός έστιν. τοίς δέ δή τοιούτοις άνήρ 
ΰπομνήμασιν όρθώς χρώμενος, τελέους άεί τελετάς τελούμενος, τέλεος όντως μόνος 
γίγνεται· I here follow Thompson 1868 in emending ιόν to ίόντ’ to keep the άνθρωπον as 
the subject of the process of collection by reasoning, understanding λεγόμενον as a 
characteristic hedging of terminology when discussing the forms, rather than as the 
abstract subject of the process of reasoning, ‘the thing said’. 
15 Cp. Aristotle de Mem. 45338-10. του μέν μνημονεύειν καί των άλλων ζφων μετέχει πολλά, 
του δ’ άναμιμνήσκεσθαι οΰδέν ώς είπείν των γνωριζομένων ζφων, πλήν άνθρωπος, αίτιον 
δ’ ότι τό άναμιμνήσκεσθαί έστιν οιον συλλογισμός τις· Many other animals share in 
remembering, while of the known animals one may say that none other than man shares 
in recollecting. The explanation is that recollection is a sort of reasoning. 
16 246cd. But we, though we have never seen or rightly conceived a god, imagine an 
immortal 
being which has both a soul and a body which are united for all time. άλλά πλάττομεν 
οΰτε ίδόντες οΰτε ίκανώς νοήσαντες θεόν, αθάνατόν τι ζώον, έχον μέν ψυχήν, έχον δέ 
σώμα, τόν άεί δέ χρόνον ταΰτα συμπεψυκότα. 
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inspiring of love.17 
250b, de 
Beauty is thus the image of truth that is most easily approached starting with the senses, so it 
most easily evokes the madness of eros that drives the lover along the path of recollection. 
The image of the divine statue illustrates the correct way for the lover to respond to this 
stimulus. The philosophic lover selects from among the beautiful youths he sees one who 
reminds him of the nature of the god he followed before incarnation and treats that youth like 
a statue of the god. 
Now each one chooses his love from the ranks of the beautiful according to his character, 
and he fashions him and adorns him like a statue, as though he were his god, to honor and 
worship him.18 
252de 
As the anecdote with which we began shows, a lover can behave very badly towards a 
divine statue, but the philosophic lover treats this image of the god (agalma) with honor (timé) 
and religious ritual behavior (orgia). This divine statue reminds the lover of the vision of 
Beauty itself, described as an image sitting upon a statue base; the beautiful beloved as a statue 
is an image of Beauty as a statue.19 
What then is the proper way to behave to a divine statue? What honors and rites are 
appropriate and how should they be conducted? Plato here relies upon his ancient readers’ 
understanding of Greek cult practice, but even modern scholars can pick up on some of the 
suggestions from the language Plato uses of orgia and teletai. The appropriate behavior to this 
image of the divine includes sacrifice, adornment of the image, and, most importantly, 
following the image as if in a ritual procession. 
When the lover sees the beloved, he feels reverence (sebetai) and would go beyond that 
feeling to the action of sacrifice (tkuoi), if he did not think that such an act would be condemned 
as madness (mania). 
But he who is newly initiated, who beheld many of those realities, when he sees a godlike 
face or form which is a good image of beauty, shudders at first, and something of the old 
awe comes over him, then, as he gazes, he reveres the beautiful one as a god, and if he did 
not fear to be thought stark mad, he would offer sacrifice to his beloved as to an idol or a 
god.20 
 
17 δικαιοσύνης μέν οΰν καί σωφροσύνης καί όσα άλλα τίμια ψυχαΐς ούκ έ'νεστι φέγγος ούδέν 
έν τοίς τήδε όμοιώμασιν, άλλά δι’ άμυδρών οργάνων μόγις αύτών καί ολίγοι έπί τάς 
εικόνας ίόντες θεώνταιτότού είκασθέντος γένος... περί δέ κάλλους, ώσπερ εϊπομεν, μετ’ 
εκείνων τε έλαμπεν ον, δεύρό τ’ έλθόντες κατειλήφαμεν αύτό διά τής εναργέστατης 
αίσθήσεως των ήμετέρων στίλβον εναργέστατα, όψις γάρ ήμίν όξυτάτη των διά τού 
σώματος έρχεται αισθήσεων, ή φρόνησις ούχ όράται—δεινούς γάρ άν παρείχεν έρωτας, 
ε’ι τι τοιούτον έαυτής εναργές εϊδωλον παρείχετο εις όψιν ιόν—καί τάλλα όσα έραστά· 
νύν δέ κάλλος μόνον ταύτην έ'σχε μοίραν, ώστ’ έκφανέστατον είναι καί έρασμιώτατον. 
ι8 τόν τε ούν έ'ρωτα τών καλών πρός τρόπου εκλέγεται έκαστος, καί ώς θεόν αύτόν εκείνον 
όντα έαυτώ οιον άγαλμα τεκταίνεταί τε καί κατακοσμεί, ώς τιμήσων τε καί όργιάσων. 
19 254b ίδόντος δέ του ηνιόχου η μνήμη πρός τήν του κάλλους ψύσιν ήνέχθη, καί πάλιν 
εΤδεν αυτήν μετά σωφροσύνης έν άγνω βάθρω βεβώσαν. And as the charioteer looks 
upon him, his memory is borne back to the true nature of beauty, and he sees it standing 
with prudence upon a holy pedestal. 
20 ó δέ άρτιτελής, ò των τότε πολυθεάμων, όταν θεοειδές πρόσωπον ι'δη κάλλος εύ 
μεμιμημένον ή τινα σώματος ιδέαν, πρώτον μέν έ'ψριξε καί τι τών τότε ΰπήλθεν αυτόν 
δειμάτων, είτα προσορών ώς θεόν σέβεται, καί εί μή έδεδίειτήντής σψόδρα μανίας δόξαν, 
θύοι άν ώς άγάλματικαί θεωτοίς παιδικοΐς. 
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251a 
Beyond this initial impulse to sacrifice, the lover performs the kind of adornment of statues 
(katakosmei) that was a common element of cult. However, he also fashions (tektainetai) the 
statue to better represent the god. Precisely how a statue is made more like the god is not 
specified, but the pouring of divine qualities over the soul of the beloved it is compared to the 
rites of the Bac- chai pouring liquids.21 Our knowledge of ancient ritual does not permit us to 
understand the ritual to which this metaphor refers, but we have testimonies to various other 
rituals that involve the kosmesis of the statue of the god, whether providing it with washing 
and anointing it, new garments, or decorating it with jewelry or other precious items.22 The 
adornments and purifications serve to increase the material statue’s likeness to the divine entity 
which it represents, just as the lover’s treatment of the beloved increases the likeness to the 
divinity their souls follow; they are both kinds of assimilation of something in the mortal realm 
to the divine. This project of assimilation to the divine appears elsewhere in the Platonic 
dialogues as the ultimate goal of the philosophic life, so the image of the interactions with the 
beautiful beloved as performing such rituals with the statue of the god serves to illustrate with 
the familiar ritual actions both the erotic relationship and the philosophic life of which it is a 
part.23 
Another ritual action that appears as part of the lover’s interaction with the beloved 
statue is the common ritual of the festive procession that follows in the train of the divine 
 
2ΐ 253ab καί τούτων δή τόν έρώμενον αίτιώμενοι έ'τι τε μάλλον άγαπώσι, καν έκ Διός 
άρύτωσιν 
ώσπερ αί βάκχαι, έπί τήν του ερωμένου ψυχήν έπαντλούντες ποιουσιν ώς δυνατόν 
όμοιότατοντώ σφετέρω θεω. Now they consider the beloved the cause of all this, so they 
love him more than before, and if they draw the waters of their inspiration from Zeus, like 
the bacchantes, they pour it out upon the beloved and make him, so far as possible, like 
their god. 
22 The Plynteria at Athens involved taking the adornments off the statue of Athena Polias, 
purifying them and washing the statue (the festival also included a procession). The Pana- 
thenaia procession brought a new peplos each year to adorn the statue of Athena on the 
acropolis. Cp. Sourvinou-Inwood 2011, esp. 214-219. Sourvinou-Inwood also discusses 
rites for Artemis of Ephesos, where the ritual procession involved the services of a 
kosmophoros, someone who carried the jewelry and other adornments, as well asa 
kosmeteira, an official whose duty it was to care for the adorning. (Sourvinou-Inwood 
2011:184, with n. 162). The Neoplatonist commentator Hermias discusses how the 
consecration of an image makes it more divine [in Plat. Phaedrum, p. 87.4-12 Couvreur): 
“But how can an image also be said to be inspired? Perhaps the thing itself cannot respond 
actively to the divine, inasmuch as it is without life; but the art of consecration purifies its 
matter, and, by attaching certain marks and symbols to the image, first gives it a soul by 
these means, and makes it capable of receiving a kind of life from the universe, thereafter 
preparing it to receive illumination from Divinity.” Πώς δέ καί αγαλμα λέγεται ένθουσιάν; 
Ή αΰτό μέν οΰκ ένεργεί περί τό θειον, δ γε άψυχόν έστιν, άλλά τήν ύλην ή τελεστική 
διακαθήρασα καί τινας χαρακτήρας καί σύμβολα περιθεΐσα τω άγάλματι πρώτον μέν 
έ'μψυχον αΰτό διά τούτων έποίησε καί (οιόν τε) ζωήν τινα έκ τού κόσμου καταδέξασθαι, 
έπειτα μετά τούτο έλλαμψθήναι παρά τού θείου αύτό παρεσκεύα- σεν όπερ αγαλμα άεί 
χρηματίζει έως δύνανται δέχεσθαι οί έπιτήδειοι· τό μέν γάρ αγαλμα ώς αν τελεσθή μένει 
έψεξής έως αν πάντη άνεπιτήδειον γένηται πρός τήν θεών έλλαμψιν 
23 όμοίωσις θεω κατά τό δυνατόν Tkt. 176b; ср. Rep. 613b εις όσον δυνατόν άνθρώπω 
όμοιουσθαι θεω. See also Tim. goce. Cp. Sedley 1999 for this tradition, as well as Annas 
1999: 52-71 for a discussion of the place of this assimilation to the divine in Platonic 
ethics. See also van Riel in this volume for the relation to making images. Morgan 2012 
approaches this issue from the angle of divine possession or inspiration (enthousiasmos), 
showing how Plato in the Phaedrus reworks ideas of the passive possessed poet into a 
more active process of reflection and incorporation of the divine. 
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image. Like sacrifice or adorning the statue, such a procession was a part of many different 
rituals, and the imagery of the discarnate souls following the divinity at the head of the 
procession through the cosmos to the hyperouranian realm would surely recall such ritual 
processions for Plato’s readers.24 On earth, the lover likewise follows in the footsteps of the 
god, but he does so through the process of recollection, discovering within himself the traces 
that lead him back by memory to the vision of the divine. 
Following the tracks back from within themselves to find the nature of their god, they 
succeed on their way, because they have been compelled to keep their eyes fixed upon the 
god, and as they reach and grasp him by memory they are inspired and receive from him 
character and habits, so far as it is possible for a man to have part in the divine. Now they 
consider the beloved the cause of all this, so they love him more than before, and if they 
draw the waters of their inspiration from Zeus, like the bacchantes, they pour it out upon 
the beloved and make him, so far as possible, like their god.25 
2533b 
This movement back along the tracks (ichneuontes) by memory not only recalls following the 
gods in the heavens, but also the movement in the recollection process from manifold sense 
perceptions by reasoning to the unity in 249c. It is also echoed in Socrates’ later comment of 
the way he behaves when he encounters someone who understands the logical processes of 
collection and division. 
 
Now I myself, Phaedrus, am a lover of these processes of division and collection, 
so that I may be able to speak and to think; and if I consider any other man able 
to see things that can naturally be collected into one and divided into many, I 
follow that one and “walk in his track as if he were a god.”26 266b 
The repetition of the term for track (ichnion) links these passages, as the process of recollection 
by means of collection and division is given illustration with the image of the ritual procession. 
The proper way to use the vision of the beautiful beloved is like following the image of a god 
in a procession, moving along the path marked out by the movement of the god to the final 
destination, where the final rituals, the teletai, are performed. Such rituals are indeed the final 
reward of the one who makes proper use of recollection, “Indeed a man who employs such 
memories rightly is always being initiated into perfect mysteries and he alone becomes truly 
 
24 Parke 1977: 22-23 notes the importance of processions in many festivals, including the 
massive celebrations of the Panathenaia and the procession to Eleusis for the Mysteries. 
He notes as well the parody in Aristophanes Ecclesiazeusai 730 ff., to which might be 
added the parody of the Dionysiac phallic processions in the Archamians 241-263. For an 
overview of festival processions in textual and visual evidence, see True, et al. 2004. 
25 ίχνεύοντες δέ παρ’ εαυτών άνευρίσκειν τήν του αφετέρου θεού ψύσιν εύπορούσι διά τό 
συντόνως ήναγκάσθαι πρός τον θεόν βλέπειν, καί έψαπτόμενοι αύτού τή μνήμη 
ένθουσιώντες έξ εκείνου λαμβάνουσι τά έ'θη καί τά επιτηδεύματα, καθ’ οσον δυνατόν 
θεού άνθρώπω μετασχείν καί τούτων δή τον έρώμενον αίτιώμενοι έ'τι τε μάλλον άγαπώσι, 
καν έκ Διάς άρύτωσιν ώσπερ αί βάκχαι, έπί τήν τού ερωμένου ψυχήν έπαντλούντες 
ποιουσιν ώς δυνατόν όμοιότατον τω σφετέρω θεω. 
26 Τούτων δή έ'γωγε αύτός τε εραστής, ώ Φαίδρε, των διαιρέσεων καί συναγωγών, ϊνα οιός 
τε ώ λέγειν τε καί ψρονεΐν έάν τέ τιν’ άλλον ήγήσωμαι δυνατόν εις έν καί έπί πολλά 
πεψυκόθ’ όρον, τούτον διώκω “κατόπισθε μετ’ ιχνιον ώστε θεοΐο.” The dactylic verse 
resembles several Homeric lines ( Odyssey 2.406,3.30,5.193,7.38, as well as Iliad22.157), 
but may be an ad hoc improvisation rather than a quotation from a hexameter source no 
longer extant. 
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perfect.”27 
Treating Him Wrong 
The rewards of those who use recollection rightly are thus like the joys of celebrating the most 
perfect festivals, but Plato also illustrates the fate of those who use recollection wrongly. Just 
as one can treat a statue of a god improperly, so too one can treat the beautiful beloved or other 
image of the divine improperly. In contrast to the perfectly initiated philosopher, the one whose 
extraordinary experience of the divine was long ago and only imperfectly preserved may fail 
to make the connection between the image of beauty before him and the vision of divine beauty 
before incarnation. 
Now he who is not newly initiated, or has been corrupted, is not borne swiftly back thither 
from here toward the beautiful itself when he sees  
 
the namesake of it here, with the result that, when he sees it, he does not worship it, but rather 
abandoning himself to pleasure he attempts to mount like a four-footed beast and to beget 
children, and consorting with hubris he neither fears nor is ashamed in his pursuit of pleasure 
against nature.28 
250e 
Because he is not moved from this earthly world back to the divine (ouk oxeôs enthende ekeise 
pheretai), he fails to treat the image reverently, and so his reaction to beauty is not true erotic 
madness but simply bestial lust. The graphic description of the horse attempting to have sex 
with the statue, the divine image that the beautiful beloved presents, represents this improper 
reaction. The dark horse tries to leap upon the beloved (epipêdan tô erômenô), dragging his 
unwilling yokemate and the charioteer along, forcing them to approach the beloved and jogging 
their memory about the pleasures of sex. 29  Note the use of a memory related term here 
 
27 249c τοίς δέ δή τοιούτοις άνήρ ύπομνήμασιν όρθώς χρώμενος, τελέους άεί τελετάς 
τελούμενος, τέλεος όντως μόνος γίγνεται· No English translation can capture the word 
play of “τελέους άεί τελετάς τελούμενος, τέλεος”—perfect, eternally perfected in perfect 
perfections. 
28 ó μέν ούν μή νεοτελής ή διεφθαρμένος ούκ όξέως ένθένδε έκεΐσε φέρεται πρός αΰτό τό 
κοΰλος, θεώμενος αύτού τήν τήδε επωνυμίαν, ώστ’ ού σέβεται προσορών, άλλ’ ήδονή 
παραδούς τετράπο- δος νόμον βαίνειν επιχειρείκαί παιδοσπορείν, καί ύβρειπροσομιλών 
ού δέδοικεν ούδ’ αίσχύνεται παρά φύσιν ήδονήν διώκων. Although παρά φύσιν ήδονήν 
has been taken to indicate Plato’s disapproval of homosexual activity, the passage makes 
much more sense when understood as a reference to the dark horse’s attempt to assault 
the statue, truly an act παρά φύσιν. The reference to παιδοσπορείν in any case rules out a 
critique of pederasty in particular; see Nussbaum 1999:189-192. 
29 254a. Now whenever the charioteer beholds the love-inspiring vision, and his whole soul 
is warmed by the perception, and is full of the tickling and prickings of yearning, the horse 
that is obedient the charioteer, constrained then as always by modesty, controls himself 
and does not leap upon the beloved; but the other no longer heeds the pricks or the whip 
of the charioteer, but springs wildly forward, causing all possible trouble to his mate and 
to the charioteer, and he forces them to go toward the beloved and to make for themselves 
a reminder of the pleasure of sex. όταν δ’ ούν ò ήνίοχος ίδών τό ερωτικόν ομμα, πάσαν 
αίσθήσει διαθερμήνας τήν ψυχήν, γαργαλισμού τε καί πόθου κέντρων ύποπλησθή, ό μέν 
εύπειθής τω ήνιόχω των ίππων, άεί τε καί τότε αίδοί βιαζόμενος, έαυτόν κατέχει μή 
έπιπηδάν τω έρωμένω· è δέ ούτε κέντρων ήνιοχικών ούτε μάστιγος έ'τι έντρέπεται, 
σκιρτών δέ βία φέρεται, καί πάντα πράγματα παρέχων τω σύζυγί τε καί ήνιόχω αναγκάζει 
ίέναι τε πρός τά παιδικά καί μνείαν ποιείσθαιτής των αφροδισίωνχάριτος. 
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(mneian); the improper reaction to the beautiful beloved resembles the proper reaction, but 
leads back by memory to the wrong object—sexual pleasure—rather than the correct one.30 
The result of this improper treatment is the complete contrast to the blissful life of the 
initiate. Rather than experiencing the initiates’joys of the festivals in the proximity of the gods, 
the one who engages in sex with the statue suffers the torments that the Greek mythic and 
religious tradition reserved for the restless dead, ‘to roam around the earth for nine thousand 
years and then he will go off below the earth, a mindless shade.’31 This language echoes the 
fate described for the unphilosophic in the Phaedo, where the comparison with the unburied or 
uninitiated restless dead is developed at greater length.32 
 
Rhetoric and Writing as Images of Truth 
The same contrast between proper and improper treatment of an image appears in the 
second half of the Phaedrus, where the image in question is not the beautiful beloved who 
provokes the recollection of the divine beauty, but a rhetorical speech that leads the souls of 
those who receive it. Just as the sight of the beautiful beloved leads the lover’s soul in the path 
of the divine image back to the vision of truth, so too a rhetorical speech can lead the soul of 
the hearer toward the truth—or lead him astray. 
Socrates defines rhetoric as a kind of soul-leading through words, and this action of 
leading works through the making of resemblances between things, linking their images 
together. 
Is not rhetoric in its entire nature an art which leads the soul by means of words? ... it 
would be the art by which a man will be able to produce a resemblance between all things 
between which it can be produced, and to bring to the light the resemblances produced 
and disguised by anyone else.33 
261a, 261e 
This process of psychagogia happens through the power of logos,34 both speech and reasoning, 
just as Socrates is led out into the countryside by the logoi that Phaedrus promises him. This 
leading of the soul, however, is inherently neither good nor bad; it all depends on how it is 
done.35 The correct method involves knowing how, through the processes of collection and 
division, to move to the truth, and how to adorn the logos to address the particular soul. 
A man must know the truth about all the particular things of which he speaks or writes, 
and must be able to define everything separately; then when he has defined them, he must 
know how to divide them by classes until further division is impossible; and in the same 
way he must understand the nature of the soul, must find out the class of speech adapted 
to each nature, and must arrange and adorn his discourse accordingly.36 
 
30 Cp. Morgan 2000:218 on this point. 
31 257a. έννέα χιλιάδας έτών περί γην κυλινδουμένην αυτήν καί υπό γης ανουν 
παρέξει. 
32 Cp. Edmonds 2004:184-195· 
33 τά μέν ολον ή ρητορική αν ε’ιη τέχνη ψυχαγωγία τις διά λόγων; αυτή αν εί'η, ή τις οιός 
τ’ έ'σται παν 
παντί όμοιουν των δυνατών καί οις δυνατόν, καί άλλου όμοιουντος καί
 άποκρυπτομένου εις φως 
αγειν. 
34 27id. λόγου δύναμις τυγχάνει ψυχαγωγία οΰσα. It is the function of speech to lead souls. 
35 Cp. 258d; 277de. 
36 πριν αν τις τό τε αληθές έκαστων είδη πέρι ών λέγει ή γράφει, κατ’ αΰτό 
τε παν όρίζεσθαι 
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277bc 
The rhetorical logos is adorned (diakosmêi) like the statue of the divine, since both provide an 
image of the truth that the soul can follow through the process of recollection. This process 
takes place through the same collections and divisions that Socrates has already claimed are 
necessary for the soul to reason back through memory from the sense perception of beauty to 
the unitary divine Beauty (249c), the step by step movement of recollection that moves, not 
physically but through reason. These steps may be, as Aristotle suggested, from similar to 
similar or from opposite to opposite, or they may be simply from one thing to another that is 
somehow associated with it, like Cebes and his horse. You may recall that Socrates claims that 
he follows in the tracks of one who understands such collections and divisions like a god; 
recollection is a process of reasoning that follows the tracks, the signs of the movement along 
the path, back to truth. 
The process is the same whether the word is spoken or written, since the written word 
is merely an image of the spoken word, an image of an image of 
an image of the truth.37 Socrates and Phaedrus thus agree that writing is a kind of ritual play, 
like creating the gardens of Adonis for the festival.38 
The gardens in letters he will, it seems, sow for amusement, and will write, 
when he does write, to treasure up reminders for himself, when he comes to the 
forgetfulness of old age, and for every other who goes along the same track.39 
276d 
Once again, the process is described as following a track (ichnos), but it serves as a reminder, 
something that counters forgetfulness, just as the pharmakon against forgetting that Theuth 
devises.40 
A pharmakon, however, can either bea wondrous magic potion or a dreadful poison, working 
good or harm. Just as Thamus raises doubts about the invention of Theuth, so too the process 
of soul-leading through speeches may be good or bad. If the soul is led to truth, it is good, but 
if the psychagogia does not lead the soul to truth, then it is evil. Socrates right at the beginning 
 
δυνατός γένηται, όρισάμενός τε πάλιν κατ’ εί'δη μέχρι του άτμητου τέμνειν έπιστηθή, 
περί τε ψυχής ψύσεως διιδών κατά ταΰτά, τό προσαρμόττον έκαστη φύσει είδος 
άνευρίσκων, οίίτω τιθή καί διακοσμη τόν λόγον. Cp. 273de. έάν μή τις των τε 
άκουσομένων τάς φύσεις διαριθμήσηται, 
καί κατ’ εί'δη τε διαιρείσθαι τά όντα καί μια ιδέα δυνατός ή καθ’ έν έκαστον 
περιλαμβάνειν, ου 
ποτ’ έ'σται τεχνικός λόγων πέρι καθ’ όσον δυνατόν άνθρώπω. Unless a man take account 
of the characters of his hearers and is able to divide things by classes and to comprehend 
particulars under a general idea, he will never attain the highest human perfection in the 
art of speech. 
37 276a8-g. τόν του είδότος λόγον λέγεις ζώντα καί έ'μψυχον, ου ό γεγραμμένος εϊδωλον αν 
τι λέγοιτο δικαίως. You mean the living and breathing word of him who knows, of which 
the written word may justly be called the image. In 264c, a speech is compared to a body, 
δείν πάντα λόγον ώσπερ ζωον συνεστάναι σώμα τι έχοντα αυτόν αΰτου, ώστε μήτε 
άκέψαλον είναι μήτε απουν, άλλά μέσα τε έχειν καί ακρα, πρέποντα άλλήλοις καί τω άλω 
γεγραμμένα. Every discourse must be organized, like a living being, with a body of its 
own, as it were, so as not to be headless or footless, but to have a middle and members, 
composed in fitting relation to each other and to the whole. Cp. also the idea that bodies 
of the dead are eidola of the person, while the real thing is the soul, in Laws 95gb4. 
38 276b. 
39 άλλά τους μέν έν γράμμασι κήπους, ώς έ'οικε, παιδιάς χάριν σπερεί τε καί γράψει, όταν δέ 
γράψη, έαυτω τε υπομνήματα θησαυριζόμενος, εις τό λήθης γήρας έάν ϊκηται, καί παντί 
τω ταΰτόν ίχνος μετιόντι. 
40 274β. μνήμης τε γάρ καί σοφίας ψάρμακον ηΰρέθη. For I have discovered a magic 
potion for memory and wisdom. 
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of the dialogue claims that Phaedrus has found the pharmakon to lead him anywhere, speeches 
in books, but it is not clear where Lysias’ speech may lead them.41 
Socrates, it is true, is dazzled after the speech, not, however, by the speech itself, but rather 
by the vision of the beautiful Phaedrus, with whom he joins in bacchic revels. 
More than that, it is miraculous, my friend; I am quite overcome by it. And this is due to 
you, Phaedrus, because as I looked at you, I saw that you were delighted by the speech as 
you read. So, thinking that you know more than I about such matters, I followed in your 
train and joined you in the divine frenzy.42 
234d 
Phaedrus, by contrast, fails to realize that the speech itself is a problem, that it leads not to truth 
but to the merely apparent or probable (to eikos), like the speeches of other unscrupulous 
rhetoricians in the lawcourts.43 
Such speeches lead the soul along the path in the same manner as philosophic speeches, 
step by step through associations, but ‘praising the “shadow of an ass” under the name of a 
horse’, associating the good elements of a horse— its value at home and for fighting in war—
with a mere image of something that only appears somewhat like a horse.44 And, as Socrates 
points out, misleading someone to think an ass is a horse is merely absurd, but misleading a 
city to think that evil is good is a serious problem. 
Phaedrus’ real problem, however, is less that he is enchanted by the conclusions to 
which Lysias’ speech leads him than that he looks upon the speech itself as a delight (agalma) 
and source of pleasure.45 Rather than use the speech as a stimulus to move to new conclusions 
through reasoning, as Socrates induces him to do, he had intended to spend the day memorizing 
it word for word so that he could fix it in his mind. His eros for logoi is like the nameless 
youth’s desire for the statue, a misguided response to the stimulus of beauty of form. Although 
he gushes enthusiastically that “nobody could ever speak about
 
41 230de. συ μέντοι δοκείς μοι τής έμής έξόδου τό φάρμακον ηΰρηκέναι. ώσπερ γάρ οί τά 
πεινώντα θρέμματα θαλλόν ή τινακαρπόν προσείοντες άγουσιν, συ έμοίλόγους οίίτω 
προτείνων έν βιβλίοις τήν τε Αττικήν ψαίνη περιάξειν άπασαν καί όποι άν όίλλοσε βούλη. 
Butyou seem to have found the charm to bring me out. For as people lead hungry animals 
by shaking in front of them a branch of leaves or some fruit, just so, I think, you, by 
holding before me discourses in books, will lead me all over Attica and wherever else you 
please. 
42 δαιμονίως μέν oSv, ώ εταίρε, ώστε με έκπλαγήναι. καί τούτο έγώ έ'παθον διά σέ, ώ Φαιδρέ, 
πρός σέ άποβλέπων, άτι έμοί έδόκεις γάνυσθαι υπό του λόγου μεταξύ άναγιγνώσκων 
ηγούμενος γάρ σέ μάλλον ή έμέ έπαΐειν περί των τοιούτων σοί είπόμην, καί επόμενος 
συνεβάκχευσα μετά σου της θείας κεφαλής. 
43 272e τό παράπαν γάρ οΰδέν έν τοΐς δικαστηρίοις τούτων αλήθειας μέλειν ούδενί, άλλά 
τού 
πιθανού· τούτο δ’ είναι τό είκός. For in the courts, they say, nobody cares for truth
 about 
these matters, but for that which is convincing; and that is probability. 
44 260c. περί όνου σκιάς ώς ϊππου τόν έπαινον ποιούμενος. 
45 Although note the arguments of Nussbaum 1986 for reasons that Lysias’ conclusions
 might 
also appeal to Phaedrus. 
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it more exhaustively or worthily” than Lysias has done, he becomes even more excited at the 
idea that Socrates might offer him something better, even threatening in jest to engage in sexual 
assault if he does not get what he wants. “We are alone in a solitary spot, and I am stronger 
than you and younger; so, under these circumstances, take my meaning, and be persuaded, not 
under compulsion but willingly, to speak.”46 
All along, however, Socrates has a different plan in mind, a joint ritual celebration like 
the metaphorical one of the two lovers in the palinode. Not only does he claim to have been a 
fellow bacchi с reveler with Phaedrus at end of the speech, but he pretends from the beginning 
that such was Phaedrus’ intent as well. “And meeting the man who is sick with the love of 
discourse, he was glad when he saw him, because he would have someone to share his 
Korybantic revel, and told him to lead on.”47 The wild ecstatic festivities of the Bacchic and 
Korybantic rites would be, in the terms of the palinode, kinds of telestic madness, but they also 
recall the ritual celebrations of the Adonis festival to which writing is likened, as well as the 
ritual celebrations and processions in the train of the gods and their images. 
Conclusions 
Throughout the dialogue, then, Plato draws the contrast between Socrates’ and 
Phaedrus’ treatment of images, first and foremost the image of writing, but also their attitudes 
towards erotic relations with the visible image of beauty in the world. The graphic scene of the 
dark horse trying to have sex with the beloved statue serves as a vivid image of how not to 
treat an image, to satisfy one’s desire with the symbol rather than continuing along the path 
toward truth. This image illustrates what happens when someone like Phaedrus idolizes Lysias’ 
speech or when anyone substitutes writing for the recollection of truths. By contrast, the proper 
use of writing is to treat it as a playful ritual that leads beyond itself. In the image of the myth, 
the lover likewise celebrates rituals around the status of his beloved, honoring the memory of 
the god whom he was following to truth in the heavens. The process of recollection is a process 
of moving through memory from particulars towards the divine truth of which they are the 
images, and so important is this art that Socrates will follow in the tracks of the one performing 
it like a god.48 
The tracks (ichnê) are the signs which the lover follows in the process of recollection, 
which raises again the question of how Plato sees the relation of the image to the thing it 
represents. The stain on the statue’s thigh is a track (ichnos) that indicates the misguided lover 
who created it. Like the tracks (ichnê) left behind in a written speech for readers to follow, 
 
46 235b. παρά τά έκείνω είρημένα μηδέν’ αν ποτε δύνασθαι είπείν άλλα πλείω καί πλείονος 
αξια. 236d. έσμέν δέ μόνω έν έρημία, ισχυρότερος δ’ έγώ καί νεώτερος, έκ δέ απάντων 
τούτων ‘σύνες δ τοι λέγω,’ καί μηδαμώς πρός βίαν βουληθης μάλλον ή έκών λέγειν. Note 
how Phaedrus holds back the punchline, as it were, of the joke until the ends of the phrases. 
“I am stronger than you... and younger”, rather than older and stronger, as an adult erastes 
would be. Likewise, he saves the verb ‘to speak’ until the end, to substitute for χαρίζεσθαι 
or some such verb. 
47 228c. άπαντήσας δέ τω νοσούντι περί λόγων άκοήν, ίδών μέν, ίδών, ήσθη ότι έξοι τόν 
συγκορυ- βαντιώντα, καί προάγειν έκέλευε. 
48 The Neoplatonist Olympiodorus shows he has picked up on the message: in Gorgiam 47.5. 
Καί μή νομίσητε άτι οί φιλόσοφοι λίθους τιμώσι καί τά είδωλα ώς θεία· άλλ’ επειδή κατ’ 
αϊσθησιν ζώντες ού δυνάμεθα έψικέσθαι τής άσωμάτου καί άύλου δυνάμεως, πρός 
ύπόμνησιν εκείνων τά είδωλα έπινενόηται, ΐνα όρώντες ταύτα καί προσκυνούντες εις 
έννοιαν έρχώμεθα των άσωμάτων καί άύλων δυνάμεων. And do not think that 
philosophers honor stones and images as divine. But, because we live in the sensory world 
and are not able to reach up to the bodiless and immaterial power, we have devised for 
ourselves images as a reminder of those things, so that by seeing them and doing reverence 
to them we may come to a notion of those bodiless and immaterial powers. 
P U T T I N G  H I M  O N  A  P E D E S T A L  8 0  
 
such a sign may be considered an index in Peircean terms; that is, they do not directly resemble 
the things they signify but they indicate its existence and lead the way back toward it through 
a process of reasoning.49 So too, the tracks that the lover follows from the vision of the 
beautiful boy are indices of the divine beauty, and it is worth considering whether the Peircean 
index may bea useful way to think about the relation between what Plato sometimes calls 
Forms and the particulars. The Beautiful itself leaves its tracks in the physical appearance of 
someone or thing, just as Justice leaves its tracks in a law or custom. Beauty’s tracks are easier 
to see and to follow, however; the footprints of Justice are delicate and faint. Socrates always 
seeks to follow such tracks in his philosophical discourses, leading both himself and his 
interlocutors step by discursive step toward those originals that left the impressions. 
Throughout the dialogue, Plato poses the problem of the image, how it can be used 
improperly for immediate gratification or properly for recollection. The vivid image of the 
dark horse’s attempted assault picks up on the theme of agalmatophilia in Greek culture, 
providing a striking image of the wrong way to treat an image, while images of ritual 
celebration point to the proper treatment of an image. An image, be it a vision of a beautiful 
beloved or a beautifully crafted speech, sets the soul in motion, leading it along the path. After 
their discussion by the banks of the Ilissus, then, what path will Socrates and Phaedrus take? 
What path Plato’s readers? The questions of whence and whither continue to haunt the 
dialogue, from its opening lines to its final ‘let’s 
go’· 
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